Avicenna and Al-Ghazālī and the Making of Mullā Ṣadrā's Metaphysics Sayeh Meisami, Ph.D.

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## Abstract:

By analyzing Mullā Sadrā's metaphysics, the proposed presentation will discuss the profound impact of both Avicenna and Al-Ghazālī on post-classical philosophy in Iran. The 16<sup>th</sup> century Safavid philosopher, Mullā Sadrā Shīrāzī (d. 1045/1635-6) famously created an existence-oriented monistic metaphysics out of synthesizing Avicennian and Sufi ideas. I argue that, with respect to the Avicennian influence, he relates the logical structure of propositional knowledge to the metaphysical structure of the world. After attributing necessity to propositions which are necessary at indefinite times (al-qadāyā al-dā'ima), he argues that to understand this, one must refer to "the science that is nobler," i.e. metaphysics, according to which all things, even temporal occurrences ( $al-h\bar{a}dith\bar{a}t$ ) are necessary in relation to the origins (al-mab $\bar{a}d\bar{i}$ ) and in relation to the [rest of] universal propositions and the order [of the universe] in total. At this level, his position is premised on the Avicennan axiom in *ilāhīyāt* al-shifā according to which, "whatever is possible in its existence does not exist unless rendered necessary with respect to its cause." As evidenced by his al-Ta'līqāt 'alā ilāhīyāt alshifā and al-Asfār, Mullā Sadrā adapts the above axiom into his metaphysics as a premise for his own argument for the necessary connection among all things in the world in virtue of their existential unity. I argue that to move from Avicenna's position to existential unity, Mullā Şadrā interprets the Avicennian above-mentioned axiom in light of Al-Ghazālī's attribution, in his *Iḥyā ``ulūm al-dīn*, of true knowledge to a "True unifier who does not see anything but God." I will show in the paper that although Mullā Sadrā's metaphysics is influenced by a host of preceding philosophers and Sufis, at the very ground level of his metaphysics, one often reaches Avicenna and al-Ghazālī, both of whom he reveres greatly in all his writings.